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Abstract— Dense urban traffic environments can produce
situations where accurate prediction and dynamic models are
insufficient for successful autonomous vehicle motion planning.
We investigate how an autonomous agent can safely negotiate
with other traffic participants, enabling the agent to handle
potential deadlocks. Specifically we consider merges where the
gap between cars is smaller than the size of the ego vehicle. We
propose a game theoretic framework capable of generating and
responding to interactive behaviors. Our main contribution is
to show how game-tree decision making can be executed by an
autonomous vehicle, including approximations and reasoning
that make the tree-search computationally tractable. Addition-
ally, to test our model we develop a stochastic rule-based traffic
agent capable of generating interactive behaviors that can be
used as a benchmark for simulating traffic participants in a
crowded merge setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
Much of the long tail around autonomous driving behav-
ior relates to complex interactions between self-interested
agents. Since other traffic participants exhibit a great deal
of variety and are often neither purely adversarial, nor
purely cooperative, it can be difficult to reason about their
behavior. However this type of reasoning is essential to
numerous traffic situations in congested traffic such as over-
crowded merge scenarios depicted in Figure 1. In these
scenarios, many popular algorithms, such as those based on
gap estimation [1], will be forced to wait indefinitely.
To address the problem of interacting with self-interested
agents, we formulate the problem as a stochastic game [2],
[3]. This formulation gives us the ability to reason over mul-
tiple outcomes and safely handle agents in an adaptive and
online manner. Sequential decision making problems, like
the crowded merge scenario, are more commonly formulated
as Markov Decision Processes (MDPs). While MDPs have
been used for robot interaction [4] and have been the focus of
much work in autonomous driving [5], [6], [7], they assume
agents follow a set distribution which limits an autonomous
agent’s ability to handle non-stationary agents which change
their behavior over time.
We instead focus our research on searching stochastic
game trees. Stochastic games and the partially observable
variant, interactive POMDPs [8], have both been proposed to
enable greater ability to reason about interactions. However
this increased power comes at the cost of increased compu-
tational expense. Tree searches, such as Monte-Carlo Tree
Search (MCTS) [9] and its variants [10] have been applied
successfully to robotic systems [11], and some research has
extended tree-based search strategies to handle intentions by
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Fig. 1: Interactive Behavior In Merging. The ego car
(shown in red) needs to interact with the cars in the lane it
wishes to enter in order to create an opening. If the ego car
were to wait for an opening, it may have to wait indefinitely,
greatly frustrating drivers behind it.
modeling them as beliefs [6], [12]. But these works do not
explicitly reason about the other agent’s actions which limits
the ability to express agent interaction.
Currently, one of the most popular approaches for solving
stochastic games for multi-agent systems involves using deep
neural networks (DNNs) and reinforcement learning (RL)
[13]. However, physical systems, which can be damaged
by bad actions, are poorly suited to the exploration of RL
and the large sample complexity of DNNs. Training in
simulation rarely transfers [14], [15]. And transfer is likely
to be worse in the case of stochastic games which are known
to stereotype to the behavior of the agents they are trained
against [16], [17], [18]. Working with the game trees directly
produces interpretable decisions which are better suited to
safety guarantees, and ease the debugging of undesirable
behavior. However, the intractability of solving a game tree
requires approximations to be made.
Several strategies have been proposed to make solving
these problems more efficient. These techniques include
making assumptions that restrict branching such as using k-
level reasoning [19], assuming simplified models of other
agents [20], and using temporarily extended actions to re-
duce the required depth of a search [21]. There are other
works in autonomous driving literature which also use game
theoretic strategies, and like our work, they adopt some of
these approximations. However, compared to our work, these
approaches either do not allow for the stochasticity of the
other agents [22], or only model intentions and do not have
interactive behaviors [23].
To solve the games efficiently we adopt existing tech-
niques from the literature and introduce autonomous-driving
specific approximations. Additionally, we work through de-
sign elements related to mapping merge behaviors to the
traditional stochastic game formulation.
In order to validate our behavior we need interactive agents
to test against. This produces a ‘chicken and egg’ problem,
where we need to have an intelligent agent to develop and test
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our agent. To address this problem we develop a stochastic
rule-based merge behavior which can give the appearance
that agents are changing their mind. Separate to our method,
this model may be of interest to other researchers working
on merge behaviors.
II. INTERACTIVE DECISION MAKING
We start by formalizing the interactive decision making
process for an autonomous vehicle as a stochastic game.
Because game trees grow exponentially in both the num-
ber of players and actions, we discuss how we limit the
branching factor of both the agent we control (which we call
the ego agent) and the other traffic participants. Specifically
we describe how we use probabilities to reason about self-
interested agents, discuss how those probabilities are updated
online, and describe how the predicted behaviors of other
agents allow us to discretize and limit the ego agent’s action
space while still maintaining safety in the event that less
probable actions are taken by others.
A. Problem Statement and Approach
In this document we will use the subscript/superscript
notation variableagent,actiontime . In a stochastic game, at time t
each agent i in state st takes an action ait according to their
policy pii. All the agents then transition to the state st+1
and receive a reward rit. Stochastic games can be described
as a tuple 〈S,A, P,R〉, where S is the set of states, and
A = {A1, . . . ,An} is the joint action space consisting of
the set of each agent’s actions, where n is the number of
agents. The reward functions R = {R1, . . . ,Rn} describe
the reward for each agent S × A → R. The transition
function P : S ×A× S → [0, 1] describes how the state
evolves in response to all the agents’ collective actions.
Stochastic games are an extension to Markov Decision
Processes (MDPs) that generalize to multiple agents, each
of which has its own policy and reward function.
Nodes in a game tree represent states, the tree is rooted
at the current state s0 ∈ S , and a branch exists for every
possible set of actions. If we assume all cars have the
same action space, and there is one ego vehicle and n − 1
traffic participants, each layer of the game tree has |A|n =
|A1|×· · ·×|An| branches. For consistency of representation,
this can also be likened to a game tree where players take
turns by representing decisions of a single time step as an
n layer tree with |A| branches per node. In this stacked
representation, it is understood that the n moves are carried
out simultaneously. A game tree is depicted in Figure 3.
Finding the optimal action sequence for a fixed time
horizon T requires taking the rewards associated with the
leaf nodes and using dynamic programming to propagate up
the tree and select the actions associated with the greatest
expected return. Because the number of branches is expo-
nential in the number of agents, brute force implementations
to a horizon of depth T result in the doubly exponential
runtime of O
(
|A|nT
)
.
In autonomous driving, there are hopefully never any pure
adversaries (no one is trying to crash into our vehicle),
and zero-sum planning strategies, like minimax search with
alpha-beta pruning [24], would be prohibitively cautious. It is
more accurate to model other agents as being self interested
(they want to travel as fast as possible without crashing),
but this does not allow us to predict their actions unless we
know their values (how much do they want to avoid crashing,
how much do they value being kind to others, how much do
they want to hurry). So, to solve the game tree, we turn to
probabilities to model the expected behavior of other agents
and look for ways to limit the branching while being careful
to not assume the expected behavior of other agents.
B. Pipeline Overview
The time it takes to complete a maneuver is on the order of
several seconds. If we are making control actions at a modest
rate of 10Hz, this can result in a game tree with a depth of
tens to hundreds of layers. To get around this complexity
issue we condense sequences of actions into intentions which
follow a distribution [21]. Additionally, by using intentions,
we are able to discretize our continuous action space.
This reduces the depth of our search, but running forward
simulations for all possible ego actions and all possible com-
binations of other agents’ actions is prohibitively expensive,
we must also look at reducing the branching factor.
To reduce the number of ego-agent actions, we decompose
the actions into a subgoal selection task and a within-subgoal
set of actions. Subgoal selection is done using a probabilistic
tree search which does not require forward simulation. The
smaller set of within-subgoal intentions is then used for
forward simulation.
To reduce the number of traffic participant actions, we
select a target interactive agent and then assume level-0 (non-
interactive) [19] predictions for the other traffic agents. The
prediction set of other agents, including all possible inten-
tions for the targeted interactive agent, are then compared
against generated samples from the selected ego intention
class.
The decision making pipeline can be broken down as
follows:
• Select an intention class based on a coarse search
• Identify the interactive traffic participant
• Predict other agents’ intentions
• Sample and evaluate the ego intentions
• Act, observe, and update our probability models
A course search gives us the look ahead to break us out
of the local minima we might get trapped in from a greedy
search. A prediction of traffic participant behaviors allows
us to reason about which parts of the road are available
and when. Typically these predictions will be represented
as probability distributions to allow for variations in driver
motions.
Using the predictions of other agent motions, a set of
safe intentions is generated, taking into account the possible
different ways in which other agents may respond. Each
trajectory can then be evaluated against several metrics (risk,
efficiency, etc.) and a single trajectory is then selected.
Next we examine details of each of these components.
C. Intention Class Search
The first step is a coarse tree search. We evaluate the
probability of a successful merge m into each potential gap,
taking into account the traffic participant’s willingness to
yield y, the size of the gap g, and the distance d the gap
is from our current position. We assume the influences of
personality, distance, and gap size on success are indepen-
dent:
P (m|y, d, g) ∝ P (m|y)P (m|d)P (m|g)
P (m)
. (1)
The personality models P (m|y) which govern the
willingness-to-yield estimates are initialized to the same
prior and are updated based on how a traffic agent responds
to the ego agent’s intentions.
Distance is used as a proxy for time. This allows us to
reason about how likely a space is to be available by the time
the ego vehicle gets close to gap. To model the probability
of successfully merging given distance P (m|d) we use a
Gaussian
P (m|d) ∝ exp
(
− (d− d0)
2
σ2
)
. (2)
To compute the probability of successfully merging given
gap size P (m|g), we normalize gap lengths and then the
normalized gap gnorm is then transformed into a probability
using a logistic
P (m|g) = 1
1 + exp(−kgnorm) , (3)
where k controls the steepness of the slope.
When searching the coarse tree we only consider the
probability of success without taking into account the specific
motions the other agents may take. This simplifies the
problem to a traditional tree search problem and allows us to
use higher level planning to avoid local optima. For example,
there might be a large opening far away, which has the
greatest probability of success, but if it fails, we will have
no other options. A greedy search would target this gap, but
the Bellman equations might yield a lower probability option
with numerous backup plans.
D. Prediction
Once a specific gap is targeted, a single agent can be
identified with which the ego agent needs to interact. This
reduces the branching factor to the number of intentions that
the selected agent has available.
To predict the agent’s intentions, our method combines a
conventional prediction based on vehicle dynamics and road
geometry, and an interactive prediction that looks at how
behavior might change in response to ego agent intervention.
The first component is a common choice for prediction
modules in autonomous driving publications [25]. It derives
its predictions from kinematic models of the participants,
for example constant velocity assumptions. While clearly
a simplification, these predictions work well under many
driving conditions. However, under congested settings, for
Fig. 2: Intention Class Search Tree. Colored circles identify
the possible gaps to target. Colored edges of the tree signify
the ego agent targeting the corresponding gap. The agent
either succeeds (yellow star) or selects a different gap. The
search continues continues to a fixed depth or ends once
every gap has been attempted.
example merging in dense traffic as shown in Figure 1, these
prediction models break down.
For the second component, we consider predicting be-
havior in the presence of multiple agent interactions using
counterfactual reasoning [17]. This looks at the predicted
behavior in the absence of the ego agent, and then all the
change that occurs is credited to the actions of the ego agent.
While it is the case that a real driver may brake based on the
behavior of a driver three cars ahead of his current position,
or may change lanes in spite of his neighbors to avoid a
congestion spotted ahead, assuming a single agent as the
cause of a behavior is a useful approximation.
For tractability, we follow counterfactual reasoning. We
assume that at any given time our agent interacts with only
one other agent. We will then have multiple predictions for
this agent based on the believed responses to our latest action.
Given the Markov assumption we have:
P (avt |avt−1, aet−1, svt , set ) ∝
P (avt |avt−1, svt )P (avt |set )
P (avt )
. (4)
Intuitively, P (avt |avt−1, svt ) describes the probability of
an agent’s action based on it’s current state, including the
continuity or how likely they are to continue doing what they
were doing. This corresponds to traditional predictions based
on kinematics and road information. P (avt |set ) describes
the influencibility, or how likely the agent is to change its
behavior based on the state of the ego agent. Rather than
learning P (avt |set ), we use heuristics to model intentions both
in the absence of the ego agent and in the presence of the
ego agent, i.e. lane following and braking intentions.
E. Generating Safe Intentions
Given the set of predicted intentions, their corresponding
probabilities, and the ego agent’s targeted gap location, there
exists a substantially reduced space of possible intentions
from which the ego agent may choose.
Each sampled intention has a corresponding risk (based on
how close it gets to other vehicles), success (based on how
likely it is to achieve its goal), and comfort value (based on
the aggressiveness of the maneuvers). Since the ego agent
Fig. 3: Intention Game Tree. Triangles indicate ego agent intentions, and circles indicate intentions of the agent being
interacted with. 0 and 1 denote different discrete intentions. While the more aggressive ego intention (a=1) can give a greater
reward in the probable case that the traffic car brakes, if the car does not brake a collision occurs, so this action must be
pruned. The actions at each level of the game tree (corresponding to the oval) are equivalent to a matrix game.
does not have control over the other agent’s intentions, it
must weight expected returns based on the expected proba-
bility of the other agent’s intentions. Importantly, to ensure a
safe planning strategy, the ego agent must ensure that there is
always a viable (although not necessarily optimal) response
to the action the other agent may select. For example the
ego agent may attempt to merge, hoping the other agent will
yield. But the ego car’s attempt must be such that it has a
exit strategy (slowing down, and rerouting back to its lane) if
the other agent does not yield. In the literature, this reaction
time is referred to as the Time-to-Reaction (TTR) [26], [27]
and this sets a lower bound on our planning horizon. To fully
consider the costs of rerouting, a game tree, as depicted in
Figure 3, is used. This takes into account all the rerouting
actions required to handle the various predictions. In practice
we found that the coarse tree described in section II-C was
sufficient for long term planning and only one intention depth
needed to be considered for the fine-grained search. This
reduces the second tree to a matrix game. Note that if there
are any responses of the other agent that were not predicted,
they may still be dangerous.
F. Rewards
The stochastic game formulation allows for a single scalar
valued reward, however their are numerous values associated
with a single trajectory, i.e. risk, success, and comfort. These
values are not directly comparable so the most appropriate
way to discuss optimality is to consider only values that lie
along the pareto frontier. A user preference can then be used
to disambiguate values on the frontier.
Additionally, there is ambiguity related to the success
value. This can simply be how close we get to our desired
goal, or it can incorporate the likelihood that the ego inten-
tion elicits a favorable reaction. If probabilities of the other
agent are known, as depicted in Figure 3, the game tree
propagation takes care of the latter.
G. Update Models
After the ego agent has acted, the system is able to
observe the other traffic participants behaviors and use this to
update the probabilities described in II-C concerning whether
negotiating with the agent will result in success.
The probability of successfully merging given yielding
P (m|y) is updated using a difference equation
P (m|y)t = αP (m|y)t−1 + (1− α)ot , (5)
where o is the observation of whether the car is observed to
be yielding or not, and α is a constant which sets the update
rate. The next section describes the agents we use to evaluate
our interactive decision making process.
III. INTERACTIVE AGENTS MODEL
The agent we are trying to develop needs other intelligent
agents to interact with when evaluating our algorithm. This
presents a “chicken and egg” problem, since having such
agents available would suggest we already have intelligent
agents at our disposal. To solve this problem, we design a
rule-based stochastic model that produces behaviors that we
find reasonable, varied, and capable of changing in response
to the ego agent. Note that the model is unknown to the
ego agent, and the ego agent’s behaviors are agnostic to the
model we use.
Under non-merge conditions, traffic participants follow the
intelligent driver model (IDM) [28]. When the ego car is
aligned between two cars in the traveling direction, the rear
car may change its behavior as a result of the ego car’s
actions. The way the traffic car behaves is based on two
randomized thresholds that govern the agent’s behavior. One
threshold governs whether or not the agent reacts to the ego
car, the second threshold determines how the agent reacts.
Figure 4 illustrates how different thresholds produce dif-
ferent behaviors in response to an ego car in the same relative
position. This process can be viewed as a rule based variant
of negotiation strategies [29]: an agent proposes he go first
by making it more dangerous for the other, the other agent
accepts by backing off.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
In our experiments, cars have a length of 4.8m and a
width of 1.9m. The lane width is 3.7m. Traffic is generated
Fig. 4: Interactive Agent Behavior Model. The diagram indicates how four cars with different thresholds will all respond
to a car in the same relative position with different behavior. The yellow line indicates the lateral position at which the
traffic vehicle begins to react to the ego car. The black line indicates when the traffic car yields to let the ego car merge.
The yellow and gray shaded regions indicate the distributions from which the thresholds are sampled. If the traffic car is
reacting but not yet yielding, it exhibits aggressive behavior: moving forward to block the other agent from merging. The
first car (left most) causes a reaction where the driver accelerates to block the merge. The second car does not yet react to
the ego car, continuing to drive as usual. The third car yields to the ego car. The fourth car had been moving to block the
ego car at first, but then decided to back off and let the ego car merge.
with a mean gap width between cars corresponding to
{2.4, 4.8, 9.6}m with added noise drawn uniformly from the
range ±{0.4, 0.8, 1.6}m respectively.
As described in Equation 2, The probability of success-
fully merging given distance P (m|d) is assumed to be
proportional to a Gaussian. In our experiments, we use
σ = 25 and an additional penalty of 6m to cars in front of
the ego car to prevent overly aggressive cut in maneuvers.
We set the steepness constant in Equation 3 as k = 0.3. The
probability of successfully merging given yielding P (m|y)
is initialized to 0.5 for all cars and updated as described
is section II-G. We use a bicycle model for our vehicle
dynamics following [30]. Our search tree searches to a fixed
depth. Intentions are set to a fixed time of 2 seconds and the
system replans every second. The action with the max L1
reward vector is selected.
We perform an ablation study to examine the importance
of tree depth to the interactive planning procedure. We run 20
simulations varying the tree depth from one to three layers
deep. Each experiment is initialized with the same random
seed and the agents encounter identical situations. The entire
experiment is then repeated multiple times with different
random seeds to generate confidence intervals related to the
observed change. This is done because there are large vari-
ances on trial times, but the average stays roughly constant.
The agent behavior model has two tunable parameters. We
sample aggression thresholds for each traffic agent uniformly
from the range {−2.2, 1.1}m and reaction thresholds from
the range {−1.5, 0.4}m where 0 corresponds to the lane
marking. We also record the runtimes associated various
parts of our algorithm and use these numbers to discuss the
computation benefits of various aspects of our pipeline.
V. RESULTS
A. Depth Ablation
A sample run with a 4.8m gap is depicted in Figure 5.
We observe that including the second layer of the tree search
slightly reduces the merge time. As depicted in Table I,
the greatest benefit occurs in the most dense traffic (2.4m
gap) where the average time decreases by 0.8s± 0.3. For a
gap of 4.8m the time decreases from 11.2s to 10.9s. This
corresponds to a change of 0.3s ± 0.1. In sparser traffic
(9.6m gap) the merge times converge to within the error
margins. Adding a third layer to the tree search produces
identical results to a two layer search. We believe that this
is because there is too much unknown information to benefit
from longer horizon planning. Qualitatively inspecting the
TABLE I: Effect of Depth and Traffic Density on Time
Depth Time
2.4m gap 4.8m gap 9.6m gap
1 15.2s 11.2s 4.5s
2 14.4s 10.9s 4.5s
3 14.4s 10.9s 4.5s
results, we observe that the behavior is identical for most
trials. When there is a difference between the depth 1 and
depth 2 trials, it typically corresponds to cases where failing
is likely but recovery cost is low. The single depth search
goes with the safer decision, the deeper search is slightly
more aggressive, usually allowing it to default to the opening
selected by depth 1 if it fails.
B. Runtime Analysis
Next we discuss runtime analysis based on our empir-
ical findings. The gap selection tree search only requires
the maintenance and multiplication of probabilities and is
comparatively light weight in contrast to the full game tree
calculation which requires forward simulation and collision
checking for multiple ego and traffic intentions. Running
unoptimized python code on an Intel Xeon processor, we
can calculate the results of a gap selection tree of depth
two in approximately 0.01 seconds. This increases to 0.02
seconds for depth three. The matrix game calculation for
a single layer, sampling four ego intentions and using two
traffic intentions (brake and maintain), takes roughly 0.08
seconds. This means our entire decision making loop runs at
roughly 10Hz.
If we remove the gap selection process and instead run the
forward simulations for all gaps, we will increase the matrix
game computations by a factor of 10 (there are usually 11
traffic vehicles on the screen at a time with a 4.8m gap
width). This results in 0.8 seconds for a single layer, roughly
one minute for two layers.
Fig. 5: Visualizations of intersection tasks used for our
experiments. The first merge attempt is blocked by the traffic
vehicle, requiring the ego car to wait for the next opening.
If instead every car is an interactive agent, this increases
the traffic intentions from 2 to 210 = 1024 which will
increase computation by a factor of 512 for the first layer.
VI. CONCLUSION
We present a game theory based process for interactive
decision making for autonomous vehicles. To reduce the
computational complexity to run in real-time, we make sev-
eral approximations related to safely speeding up the game
tree search. While this approach demonstrates a successful
method for interactive merging in simulation, there is more
investigation required to run safely on an actual vehicle.
Namely, we suspect larger variation in real world scenarios.
The uncertainty related to both the perception and prediction
will need to be considered more deeply and there will likely
be latencies in the control which require more cautious
behavior sampling, or greater loop optimization.
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